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Orbitofrontal cortex is characterized by its unique
pattern of connections with subcortical areas, such
as basolateral amygdala. Here we distinguish be-
tween the critical role of these areas in associative
learning and the pivotal contribution of OFC to the
manipulation of this information to control behavior.
This contribution reflects the ability of OFC to signal
the desirability of expected outcomes, which requires
the integration of associative information with infor-
mation concerning internal states and goals in repre-
sentational memory.
The ease with which we form expectations about the
desirability of impending outcomes is readily apparent
in our emotions and behaviors. These expectations
bias us toward some behaviors and away from others.
For example, a worker expecting a raise will act dif-
ferently from a worker expecting to be fired. And when
expectations are violated, they result in strong emo-
tional reactions and facilitate learning, as anyone who
has been fired when expecting a raise can attest! The
ability to signal the relative value and current status of
expectations requires more than simply making associ-
ations between cues and the outcomes that are likely
to follow them; rather, the generation of such a signal
requires that associative information be maintained in
memory and integrated with other information concerning
internal states and goals. We will refer to such signals
and the information they reflect as outcome expectan-
cies. Expectancies provide an internal representation of
the consequences likely to follow a particular act, which
can bias behavior and facilitate learning (Dickinson,
1989).
Neural Activity in OFC and OFC-Dependent Behavior
Reflect Outcome Expectancies
The ability to maintain information so that it can be ma-
nipulated, integrated with other information, and then
used to guide behavior has been described as working
or representational memory, and it depends on prefron-
tal cortex (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Within prefrontal cor-
tex, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), by its connections
with limbic areas, is positioned to allow associative in-
formation regarding outcomes access to representa-
tional memory. Studies suggest that a neural correlate
of expected outcome value is present in OFC. For ex-
ample, imaging studies show changes in blood flow in
OFC during anticipation of outcomes and when the
value of the outcome is modified (Gottfried et al., 2003;
Nobre et al., 1999; O’Doherty et al., 2002). Furthermore,*Correspondence: schoenbg@schoenbaumlab.orgneural activity in OFC preceding predicted rewards or
punishments reflects the values of these outcomes
(Roesch and Olson, 2004; Schoenbaum et al., 1998,
2003b; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999).
These responses are acquired as animals learn what
outcome to expect and can be observed in the absence
of signaling cues. These features are illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, which shows an OFC neuron recorded in a rat
learning to discriminate between two odors on the ba-
sis of the outcomes they predict. The rat must learn
that one odor predicts availability of sucrose solution
in a nearby fluid well, while the other odor predicts
availability of quinine solution. Early in learning, this
neuron responds when the sucrose reward is presented
and also prior to sucrose presentation, during a delay
after the response has been made. During this delay,
activity in this neuron effectively signals the impending
outcome, even though there are no external cues avail-
able to indicate which will be delivered. We have found
that about 20% of the neurons in OFC develop such
activity, firing in anticipation of either sucrose or quinine
(Schoenbaum et al., 1998, 2003b). The activity in this
population reflects the value of the expected outcome
of the response, maintained in representational mem-
ory. In addition, many of these neurons, including the
example in Figure 1, also come to be activated by the
cues that predict their preferred outcomes after learn-
ing, thereby signaling the expected outcome before a
response is made. Together, these neural signals may
bias behavior to reflect expected outcomes and facili-
tate learning when expectations for outcomes are vio-
lated.
The notion that OFC facilitates learning and guides
behavior by generating outcome expectancies is con-
sistent with the effects of OFC damage on behavior.
These effects are evident when the appropriate re-
sponse requires associations to be considered in the
context of other cues to evaluate competing responses.
This is often the case in learning tasks in which the
values of the predicted outcomes are ambiguous. For
example, humans with OFC damage are unable to
guide behavior in the Iowa gambling task (Bechara et
al., 1999). In this task, subjects choose cards that have
high rewards and occasional large penalties or low re-
wards but no penalties. Normal subjects initially choose
from high-reward decks but later bias their choices to-
ward the low-reward decks as the penalties become
apparent. OFC-damaged patients also initially select
more often from the high-reward decks; however, they
fail to modify their responding to reflect the penalties,
as if they are unable to appreciate the penalties. Inte-
grating information about the probabilistic penalties
would be facilitated by an ability to maintain informa-
tion about the value of the expected outcome in repre-
sentational memory so that violations of this expecta-
tion could be recognized.
The importance of signaling outcome expectations,
and the critical role of OFC in this process, is also re-
flected in emotional reactions to outcomes. These reac-
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634Figure 1. Neural Correlates of Outcome Expectancies in OFC
Single-unit activity is shown in raster format and perievent time
histogram, synchronized to odor onset (100 ms bins; dotted line is
99% CI; top panels, Odor 1+; bottom panels, Odor 2−; odor sam-
pling, gray shading). After odor sampling, the rat had to respond at
the fluid well. On odor 1 and 2 trials, the response produced su-
crose and quinine, respectively. A delay (pre-sucrose, green; pre-
quinine, red) interposed between a response at the well and fluid
delivery serves to isolate neural activity signaling the expected
outcome.
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1tions were disrupted in a study of OFC-damaged pa-
tients making choices between two stimuli that predicted
punishment or reward (Camille et al., 2004). After each
trial, the subjects rated their affect from sad to happy.
The affective ratings of controls varied with the amount
of reward they received, but their rating also changed
when they were made aware of the reward or punish-
ment associated with the stimulus they did not select.
For example, a small reward made them happier when
they knew that they had avoided a large penalty. Nor-
mal subjects also performed better when they received
such feedback. Patients with OFC damage showed
normal emotional responses to rewards and punish-
ments; however, knowledge about the unselected out-
come had no effect on either their affective ratings or
performance. The failure of OFC-lesioned patients to
modulate emotional reactions based on this compari-
son may reflect an inability to generate outcome expec-
tancies required to compare the relative value of the
selected and unselected outcomes.
The critical role of OFC in signaling outcome expec-
tancies is also evident in reinforcer devaluation tasks.
These tasks assess the control of behavior by an in-
ternal representation of the value of an expected out-
come. In a Pavlovian version of this procedure, rats are
trained to associate a light cue with food, and then the
food is devalued by pairing it with illness. When the
light cue is presented again in an extinction session,
rats for which the food has been devalued respond less
to the cue than nondevalued controls This decrease in
responding is in addition to the normal decrease
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oaused by extinction. Thus, it is thought to reflect the
se of an internal representation of the new value of the
ood, in concert with the original light-food association.
hese two pieces of information are combined without
eexposure to the food outcome, which presumably re-
uires representational memory.
OFC-lesioned rats fail to change their behavior in this
etting after devaluation (Gallagher et al., 1999). These
ats condition and devalue normally; however, they
how no effect of devaluation on conditioned respond-
ng. They continue to respond to the light to obtain the
ood, even though they will not eat it if it is presented.
his effect is observed whether lesions are made be-
ore or after learning, indicating that OFC is not solely
nvolved in acquiring the cue-outcome association
Pickens et al., 2003). Rather, OFC is critical to control
onditioned responding according to internal represen-
ations of the new value of the expected outcome. Sim-
lar results have been reported in monkeys (Izquierdo
t al., 2004).
The idea that OFC plays a critical role in behavior by
irtue of its importance in signaling outcome expec-
ancies is at least partially consistent with other theo-
ies of OFC function. An old idea regarding OFC func-
ion is that OFC is critical for inhibiting existing responses.
y our view, OFC is critical for this because the out-
ome expectancies generated by OFC allow the animal
o contrast predicted and actual outcomes to facilitate
earning. It has also been proposed that OFC biases
ehavior by allowing cues to activate representations
f the outcome’s emotional valence (Bechara et al.,
999). Although this account has come under scrutiny
f late (Maia and McClelland, 2004), our proposal would
ontradict it insofar as we do not believe OFC is critical
or associative learning (Bechara et al., 1999). Most re-
ently, it has been proposed that OFC normalizes the
alue of competing outcomes (Montague and Berns,
002), so that one can compare, say, apples and or-
nges. We would differ with this account only in the
mphasis it places on the encoding of value. Clearly,
alue is an important component of the information
epresented in OFC, but it is also a component of en-
oding elsewhere. Roberts and colleagues have sug-
ested that OFC allows the comparison of values of
electing goals (Arana et al., 2003). We would suggest
hat the ability to compare relative values of different
oals arises from the role OFC plays in generating ex-
ectancies.
ifferentiating Orbitofrontal
nd Amygdalar Contributions
uch of the evidence for the role of OFC in signaling
utcome expectancies can also be found in studies of
mygdalar function. Damage to basolateral amygdala
ABL) causes OFC-like deficits in the devaluation task
nd in discounting tasks (Bechara et al., 1999; Hatfield
t al., 1996; Malkova et al., 1997; Winstanley et al.,
004). In addition, damage to either area alters the abil-
ty of a cue to serve as a conditioned reinforcer (Parkin-
on et al., 2001; Pears et al., 2003). These findings indi-
ate that there is substantial overlap in the function of
BL and OFC.
Other evidence suggests a dissociation of these
unctions such that ABL is critical for acquiring cue-
utcome associations, while OFC is involved in allow-
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635ing that information to be utilized to generate expec-
tancies to guide behavior. For example, in a recent im-
aging study, BOLD signal in amygdala correlates with
the incentive value of menu items, whereas signal in
OFC correlated with the value only when it was the ba-
sis of a decision (Arana et al., 2003). Similarly, in single-
unit studies, cue-selective firing in ABL emerges earlier
during learning and tracks the associated outcome with
greater fidelity than comparable activity in OFC. By
contrast, encoding in OFC is more strongly related to
the use of that information to guide accurate respond-
ing (Schoenbaum et al., 1998, 1999).
Recently, we have tested this hypothesis directly.
OFC neurons were recorded from ABL-lesioned rats as
they learned and reversed odor discriminations
(Schoenbaum et al., 2003b). ABL lesions caused a loss
of associative information in OFC, particularly during
cue sampling (“ABL lesion”; Figure 2). ABL lesions re-
duced the proportion of cue-selective neurons in OFC,
and those present were less associative. Furthermore,
ABL lesions abolished the activation of outcome-
expectant neurons during cue sampling. At the same
time, firing after responding in anticipation of the out-
comes was largely unaffected by ABL lesions. These
results are consistent with a model in which ABL is re-
quired to input and store associative information con-
cerning the value of outcomes in OFC.
By contrast, OFC lesions disrupted outcome-expec-
tant firing in ABL (Saddoris et al., 2005) (“OFC lesion”;
Figure 2). The loss of outcome-expectant firing sug-
gests that this signal is generated in OFC. ABL neurons
also became cue-selective much more slowly without
input from OFC, particularly after the cue-outcome as-
sociations were reversed. Slower associative encoding
in ABL as a result of OFC lesions is consistent with the
idea that learning in other structures should be facili-
tated by the outcome expectancies generated in OFC.
As illustrated in Figure 2, OFC and ABL normally in-
teract in intact rats, such that outcome-expectant en-
coding from OFC influences processing in ABL to facili-
tate rapid learning, while associative encoding in ABL
influences processing in OFC to allow the storage of
these associations so that they may be used to guideFigure 2. OFC-ABL Interactions in Establishing Neural Representa-
tions
ABL lesions have no effect on outcome-expectant activity in OFC
but abolish the activation of these cells during cue sampling. By
contrast, OFC lesions disrupt outcome-expectant activity in ABL.
C, cue; D, delay before outcome; O, outcome.behavior. This model provides a potential explanation
for the different deficits that have been reported after
ABL and OFC lesions. For example, OFC but not ABL
lesions slow reversal learning (Schoenbaum et al.,
2003a). This would be expected if output from OFC
were facilitating reversal of associative encoding in
ABL (Saddoris et al., 2005). This model is also consis-
tent with results from the Iowa gambling task (Bechara
et al., 1999). Patients with ABL damage, like OFC-dam-
aged subjects, fail to bias responding away from large-
reward decks and do not generate autonomic signals
when making choices from these decks. However, pa-
tients with ABL damage are also unable to generate
autonomic signals during conditioning in which a cue
is paired with a loud noise, whereas OFC-lesioned sub-
jects retain this ability. These data show that ABL dam-
age affects associative learning, whereas OFC damage
does not.
The model presented in Figure 2 also predicts dif-
ferent effects of ABL and OFC damage on behavior, de-
pending on whether that damage is sustained before
or after learning. For example, ABL lesions made before
but not after learning impair the ability of a cue to sup-
port second-order conditioning or conditioned rein-
forcement (Cousens and Otto, 2003; Malkova et al.,
1997; Setlow et al., 2002). Similarly, ABL lesions made
before but not after learning in the devaluation task im-
pair the normal reduction in conditioned responding.
By contrast, OFC lesions made after learning continue
to affect behavior in these settings (Cousens and Otto,
2003; Pears et al., 2003; Pickens et al., 2003).
A similar dissociation has also been reported in a de-
lay-discounting task. In this task, rats choose between
small, immediate rewards or larger, delayed rewards.
Rats normally respond for the large reward, but if the
delay becomes longer, rats change their behavior and
instead choose the small, immediate reward. OFC-
lesioned rats exhibit abnormal breakpoints for choos-
ing the small rather than the large reward. Rats lesioned
before any learning exhibit “impulsive” responding, de-
fined as responding for the small reward even when the
large reward is available at relatively short delays. Rats
lesioned after learning exhibit “perseverative” respond-
ing, defined as responding for the large reward at
longer delays than controls (Mobini et al., 2002; Win-
stanley et al., 2004).
This difference may reflect the dual roles OFC plays
in this paradigm. One role is to allow associative infor-
mation from ABL access to representational memory.
This role is important in performance, because it allows
the comparison of the expected values of immediate
and delayed rewards. Thus, rats lesioned after initial
training know which responses produce the large and
small rewards but are unable to maintain this informa-
tion in representational memory. Therefore, they are un-
able to discount the value of the large reward, which
results in “perseverative” responding.
However, OFC also helps facilitate associative learn-
ing in ABL, particularly during initial training. As a result,
rats lesioned before any training fail to encode the ac-
tual associations normally. This deficit renders mean-
ingless any loss of the delayed discounting function in
OFC. The resultant behavior would depend on the
associability of the response-outcome contingencies.
Neuron
636We would speculate that “impulsive” responding was
observed because the large reward was often delayed
in training, resulting in a weaker association with the re-
sponse.
By this account many behaviors that reflect the
straightforward use of easily learned associations
might be affected by ABL but not OFC lesions. A review
of the literature shows this is in fact true, for tasks as
diverse as fear conditioning and CS-potentiated feed-
ing. These tasks typically do not engage representa-
tional memory systems to manipulate the associative
information encoded by downstream limbic areas. As
such, we would agree with Dr Goldman-Rakic that
OFC, like other prefrontal regions, makes a critical con-
tribution to behavior “when internalized or inner models
of reality are used to govern behavior” (Goldman-
Rakic, 1987).
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